An abstract is required. According to metaphysicians, those features they share are called Universals. Widely, universals are often abstract while particulars are often concrete. However, this is not always the case as metaphysicians like D.M. Armstrong choose to also view universals not just as concrete, but in many lights that some other philosophers might not agree with.
As far as universals and particulars are concerned, there are two main points of view that are competing for attention (Crane & Farkas 131). The first point of view is the theory which holds that the things in existence cannot be considered to be what they really are without the sum total of all their characteristic features. The implication of this position is that whatsoever an element is, it is as a result of the features that can be attributed to it. These features also pertain to space and time. This point of view is called the Bundle Theory (Inwagen & Zimmerman 62).
The second point of view that is worthy of mention is the Substance-Attributes Theory. The Substance-Attributes Theory does not hold the opinion that the totality of a thing is the summation of all its properties, rather it opines that objects are ultimate, not their properties. Thus, there is the need to contrast between these things and the attributes they possess (Inwagen & Zimmerman 17).
The position of D.M. Armstrong is not in tandem with the Bundle Theory. What Armstrong does is that he uses the basic arguments that support bundle theory as the premises on which he build his argument against. Armstrong’s first premise against the Bundle Theory is that a thing should be regarded as nothing without its bundle of properties, which of course includes the spatial and the temporary. He then goes on to posit that “if a thing occupies the same place at different times, then it has different properties and has to be a different thing.” (56). This implies that it does not change its properties as time changes.